Support ALPN for TCP + TLS routers

This commit is contained in:
Dmitry Sharshakov 2022-07-07 17:58:09 +03:00 committed by GitHub
parent aff334ffb4
commit 4dc379c601
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4 changed files with 228 additions and 34 deletions

View file

@ -840,10 +840,11 @@ If the rule is verified, the router becomes active, calls middlewares, and then
The table below lists all the available matchers:
| Rule | Description |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| ```HostSNI(`domain-1`, ...)``` | Check if the Server Name Indication corresponds to the given `domains`. |
| ```HostSNIRegexp(`example.com`, `{subdomain:[a-z]+}.example.com`, ...)``` | Check if the Server Name Indication matches the given regular expressions. See "Regexp Syntax" below. |
| ```ClientIP(`10.0.0.0/16`, `::1`)``` | Check if the request client IP is one of the given IP/CIDR. It accepts IPv4, IPv6 and CIDR formats. |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| ```HostSNI(`domain-1`, ...)``` | Checks if the Server Name Indication corresponds to the given `domains`. |
| ```HostSNIRegexp(`example.com`, `{subdomain:[a-z]+}.example.com`, ...)``` | Checks if the Server Name Indication matches the given regular expressions. See "Regexp Syntax" below. |
| ```ClientIP(`10.0.0.0/16`, `::1`)``` | Checks if the connection client IP is one of the given IP/CIDR. It accepts IPv4, IPv6 and CIDR formats. |
| ```ALPN(`mqtt`, `h2c`)``` | Checks if any of the connection ALPN protocols is one of the given protocols. |
!!! important "Non-ASCII Domain Names"
@ -879,6 +880,13 @@ The table below lists all the available matchers:
The rule is evaluated "before" any middleware has the opportunity to work, and "before" the request is forwarded to the service.
!!! important "ALPN ACME-TLS/1"
It would be a security issue to let a user-defined router catch the response to
an ACME TLS challenge previously initiated by Traefik.
For this reason, the `ALPN` matcher is not allowed to match the `ACME-TLS/1`
protocol, and Traefik returns an error if this is attempted.
### Priority
To avoid path overlap, routes are sorted, by default, in descending order using rules length.

View file

@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ import (
"strconv"
"strings"
"github.com/go-acme/lego/v4/challenge/tlsalpn01"
"github.com/traefik/traefik/v2/pkg/ip"
"github.com/traefik/traefik/v2/pkg/log"
"github.com/traefik/traefik/v2/pkg/rules"
@ -22,6 +23,7 @@ var tcpFuncs = map[string]func(*matchersTree, ...string) error{
"HostSNI": hostSNI,
"HostSNIRegexp": hostSNIRegexp,
"ClientIP": clientIP,
"ALPN": alpn,
}
// ParseHostSNI extracts the HostSNIs declared in a rule.
@ -54,10 +56,11 @@ func ParseHostSNI(rule string) ([]string, error) {
type ConnData struct {
serverName string
remoteIP string
alpnProtos []string
}
// NewConnData builds a connData struct from the given parameters.
func NewConnData(serverName string, conn tcp.WriteCloser) (ConnData, error) {
func NewConnData(serverName string, conn tcp.WriteCloser, alpnProtos []string) (ConnData, error) {
remoteIP, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(conn.RemoteAddr().String())
if err != nil {
return ConnData{}, fmt.Errorf("error while parsing remote address %q: %w", conn.RemoteAddr().String(), err)
@ -71,6 +74,7 @@ func NewConnData(serverName string, conn tcp.WriteCloser) (ConnData, error) {
return ConnData{
serverName: types.CanonicalDomain(serverName),
remoteIP: remoteIP,
alpnProtos: alpnProtos,
}, nil
}
@ -284,6 +288,33 @@ func clientIP(tree *matchersTree, clientIPs ...string) error {
return nil
}
// alpn checks if any of the connection ALPN protocols matches one of the matcher protocols.
func alpn(tree *matchersTree, protos ...string) error {
if len(protos) == 0 {
return errors.New("empty value for \"ALPN\" matcher is not allowed")
}
for _, proto := range protos {
if proto == tlsalpn01.ACMETLS1Protocol {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid protocol value for \"ALPN\" matcher, %q is not allowed", proto)
}
}
tree.matcher = func(meta ConnData) bool {
for _, proto := range meta.alpnProtos {
for _, filter := range protos {
if proto == filter {
return true
}
}
}
return false
}
return nil
}
var almostFQDN = regexp.MustCompile(`^[[:alnum:]\.-]+$`)
// hostSNI checks if the SNI Host of the connection match the matcher host.

View file

@ -1,10 +1,12 @@
package tcp
import (
"fmt"
"net"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/go-acme/lego/v4/challenge/tlsalpn01"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"github.com/traefik/traefik/v2/pkg/tcp"
@ -58,6 +60,7 @@ func Test_addTCPRoute(t *testing.T) {
rule string
serverName string
remoteAddr string
protos []string
routeErr bool
matchErr bool
}{
@ -436,6 +439,66 @@ func Test_addTCPRoute(t *testing.T) {
serverName: "bar",
remoteAddr: "10.0.0.1:80",
},
{
desc: "Invalid ALPN rule matching ACME-TLS/1",
rule: fmt.Sprintf("ALPN(`%s`)", tlsalpn01.ACMETLS1Protocol),
protos: []string{"foo"},
routeErr: true,
},
{
desc: "Valid ALPN rule matching single protocol",
rule: "ALPN(`foo`)",
protos: []string{"foo"},
},
{
desc: "Valid ALPN rule matching ACME-TLS/1 protocol",
rule: "ALPN(`foo`)",
protos: []string{tlsalpn01.ACMETLS1Protocol},
matchErr: true,
},
{
desc: "Valid ALPN rule not matching single protocol",
rule: "ALPN(`foo`)",
protos: []string{"bar"},
matchErr: true,
},
{
desc: "Valid alternative case ALPN rule matching single protocol without another being supported",
rule: "ALPN(`foo`) && !alpn(`h2`)",
protos: []string{"foo", "bar"},
},
{
desc: "Valid alternative case ALPN rule not matching single protocol because of another being supported",
rule: "ALPN(`foo`) && !alpn(`h2`)",
protos: []string{"foo", "h2", "bar"},
matchErr: true,
},
{
desc: "Valid complex alternative case ALPN and HostSNI rule",
rule: "ALPN(`foo`) && (!alpn(`h2`) || hostsni(`foo`))",
protos: []string{"foo", "bar"},
serverName: "foo",
},
{
desc: "Valid complex alternative case ALPN and HostSNI rule not matching by SNI",
rule: "ALPN(`foo`) && (!alpn(`h2`) || hostsni(`foo`))",
protos: []string{"foo", "bar", "h2"},
serverName: "bar",
matchErr: true,
},
{
desc: "Valid complex alternative case ALPN and HostSNI rule matching by ALPN",
rule: "ALPN(`foo`) && (!alpn(`h2`) || hostsni(`foo`))",
protos: []string{"foo", "bar"},
serverName: "bar",
},
{
desc: "Valid complex alternative case ALPN and HostSNI rule not matching by protos",
rule: "ALPN(`foo`) && (!alpn(`h2`) || hostsni(`foo`))",
protos: []string{"h2", "bar"},
serverName: "bar",
matchErr: true,
},
}
for _, test := range testCases {
@ -471,7 +534,7 @@ func Test_addTCPRoute(t *testing.T) {
remoteAddr: fakeAddr{addr: addr},
}
connData, err := NewConnData(test.serverName, conn)
connData, err := NewConnData(test.serverName, conn, test.protos)
require.NoError(t, err)
matchingHandler, _ := router.Match(connData)
@ -918,6 +981,75 @@ func Test_ClientIP(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func Test_ALPN(t *testing.T) {
testCases := []struct {
desc string
ruleALPNProtos []string
connProto string
buildErr bool
matchErr bool
}{
{
desc: "Empty",
buildErr: true,
},
{
desc: "ACME TLS proto",
ruleALPNProtos: []string{tlsalpn01.ACMETLS1Protocol},
buildErr: true,
},
{
desc: "Not matching empty proto",
ruleALPNProtos: []string{"h2"},
matchErr: true,
},
{
desc: "Not matching ALPN",
ruleALPNProtos: []string{"h2"},
connProto: "mqtt",
matchErr: true,
},
{
desc: "Matching ALPN",
ruleALPNProtos: []string{"h2"},
connProto: "h2",
},
{
desc: "Not matching multiple ALPNs",
ruleALPNProtos: []string{"h2", "mqtt"},
connProto: "h2c",
matchErr: true,
},
{
desc: "Matching multiple ALPNs",
ruleALPNProtos: []string{"h2", "h2c", "mqtt"},
connProto: "h2c",
},
}
for _, test := range testCases {
test := test
t.Run(test.desc, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Parallel()
matchersTree := &matchersTree{}
err := alpn(matchersTree, test.ruleALPNProtos...)
if test.buildErr {
require.Error(t, err)
return
}
require.NoError(t, err)
meta := ConnData{
alpnProtos: []string{test.connProto},
}
assert.Equal(t, test.matchErr, !matchersTree.match(meta))
})
}
}
func Test_Priority(t *testing.T) {
testCases := []struct {
desc string

View file

@ -83,10 +83,10 @@ func (r *Router) ServeTCP(conn tcp.WriteCloser) {
// Handling Non-TLS TCP connection early if there is neither HTTP(S) nor TLS
// routers on the entryPoint, and if there is at least one non-TLS TCP router.
// In the case of a non-TLS TCP client (that does not "send" first), we would
// block forever on clientHelloServerName, which is why we want to detect and
// block forever on clientHelloInfo, which is why we want to detect and
// handle that case first and foremost.
if r.muxerTCP.HasRoutes() && !r.muxerTCPTLS.HasRoutes() && !r.muxerHTTPS.HasRoutes() {
connData, err := tcpmuxer.NewConnData("", conn)
connData, err := tcpmuxer.NewConnData("", conn, nil)
if err != nil {
log.WithoutContext().Errorf("Error while reading TCP connection data: %v", err)
conn.Close()
@ -108,7 +108,7 @@ func (r *Router) ServeTCP(conn tcp.WriteCloser) {
// FIXME -- Check if ProxyProtocol changes the first bytes of the request
br := bufio.NewReader(conn)
serverName, tls, peeked, err := clientHelloServerName(br)
hello, err := clientHelloInfo(br)
if err != nil {
conn.Close()
return
@ -125,20 +125,20 @@ func (r *Router) ServeTCP(conn tcp.WriteCloser) {
log.WithoutContext().Errorf("Error while setting write deadline: %v", err)
}
connData, err := tcpmuxer.NewConnData(serverName, conn)
connData, err := tcpmuxer.NewConnData(hello.serverName, conn, hello.protos)
if err != nil {
log.WithoutContext().Errorf("Error while reading TCP connection data: %v", err)
conn.Close()
return
}
if !tls {
if !hello.isTLS {
handler, _ := r.muxerTCP.Match(connData)
switch {
case handler != nil:
handler.ServeTCP(r.GetConn(conn, peeked))
handler.ServeTCP(r.GetConn(conn, hello.peeked))
case r.httpForwarder != nil:
r.httpForwarder.ServeTCP(r.GetConn(conn, peeked))
r.httpForwarder.ServeTCP(r.GetConn(conn, hello.peeked))
default:
conn.Close()
}
@ -155,14 +155,14 @@ func (r *Router) ServeTCP(conn tcp.WriteCloser) {
// In order not to depart from the behavior in 2.6, we only allow an HTTPS router
// to take precedence over a TCP-TLS router if it is _not_ an HostSNI(*) router (so
// basically any router that has a specific HostSNI based rule).
handlerHTTPS.ServeTCP(r.GetConn(conn, peeked))
handlerHTTPS.ServeTCP(r.GetConn(conn, hello.peeked))
return
}
// Contains also TCP TLS passthrough routes.
handlerTCPTLS, catchAllTCPTLS := r.muxerTCPTLS.Match(connData)
if handlerTCPTLS != nil && !catchAllTCPTLS {
handlerTCPTLS.ServeTCP(r.GetConn(conn, peeked))
handlerTCPTLS.ServeTCP(r.GetConn(conn, hello.peeked))
return
}
@ -170,19 +170,19 @@ func (r *Router) ServeTCP(conn tcp.WriteCloser) {
// We end up here for e.g. an HTTPS router that only has a PathPrefix rule,
// which under the scenes is counted as an HostSNI(*) rule.
if handlerHTTPS != nil {
handlerHTTPS.ServeTCP(r.GetConn(conn, peeked))
handlerHTTPS.ServeTCP(r.GetConn(conn, hello.peeked))
return
}
// Fallback on TCP TLS catchAll.
if handlerTCPTLS != nil {
handlerTCPTLS.ServeTCP(r.GetConn(conn, peeked))
handlerTCPTLS.ServeTCP(r.GetConn(conn, hello.peeked))
return
}
// needed to handle 404s for HTTPS, as well as all non-Host (e.g. PathPrefix) matches.
if r.httpsForwarder != nil {
r.httpsForwarder.ServeTCP(r.GetConn(conn, peeked))
r.httpsForwarder.ServeTCP(r.GetConn(conn, hello.peeked))
return
}
@ -300,18 +300,24 @@ func (c *Conn) Read(p []byte) (n int, err error) {
return c.WriteCloser.Read(p)
}
// clientHelloServerName returns the SNI server name inside the TLS ClientHello,
type clientHello struct {
serverName string // SNI server name
protos []string // ALPN protocols list
isTLS bool // whether we are a TLS handshake
peeked string // the bytes peeked from the hello while getting the info
}
// clientHelloInfo returns various data from the clientHello handshake,
// without consuming any bytes from br.
// On any error, the empty string is returned.
func clientHelloServerName(br *bufio.Reader) (string, bool, string, error) {
// It returns an error if it can't peek the first byte from the connection.
func clientHelloInfo(br *bufio.Reader) (*clientHello, error) {
hdr, err := br.Peek(1)
if err != nil {
var opErr *net.OpError
if !errors.Is(err, io.EOF) && (!errors.As(err, &opErr) || opErr.Timeout()) {
log.WithoutContext().Errorf("Error while Peeking first byte: %s", err)
}
return "", false, "", err
return nil, err
}
// No valid TLS record has a type of 0x80, however SSLv2 handshakes
@ -323,16 +329,23 @@ func clientHelloServerName(br *bufio.Reader) (string, bool, string, error) {
if hdr[0] != recordTypeHandshake {
if hdr[0] == recordTypeSSLv2 {
// we consider SSLv2 as TLS and it will be refused by real TLS handshake.
return "", true, getPeeked(br), nil
return &clientHello{
isTLS: true,
peeked: getPeeked(br),
}, nil
}
return "", false, getPeeked(br), nil // Not TLS.
return &clientHello{
peeked: getPeeked(br),
}, nil // Not TLS.
}
const recordHeaderLen = 5
hdr, err = br.Peek(recordHeaderLen)
if err != nil {
log.Errorf("Error while Peeking hello: %s", err)
return "", false, getPeeked(br), nil
return &clientHello{
peeked: getPeeked(br),
}, nil
}
recLen := int(hdr[3])<<8 | int(hdr[4]) // ignoring version in hdr[1:3]
@ -344,19 +357,29 @@ func clientHelloServerName(br *bufio.Reader) (string, bool, string, error) {
helloBytes, err := br.Peek(recordHeaderLen + recLen)
if err != nil {
log.Errorf("Error while Hello: %s", err)
return "", true, getPeeked(br), nil
return &clientHello{
isTLS: true,
peeked: getPeeked(br),
}, nil
}
sni := ""
server := tls.Server(sniSniffConn{r: bytes.NewReader(helloBytes)}, &tls.Config{
var protos []string
server := tls.Server(helloSniffConn{r: bytes.NewReader(helloBytes)}, &tls.Config{
GetConfigForClient: func(hello *tls.ClientHelloInfo) (*tls.Config, error) {
sni = hello.ServerName
protos = hello.SupportedProtos
return nil, nil
},
})
_ = server.Handshake()
return sni, true, getPeeked(br), nil
return &clientHello{
serverName: sni,
isTLS: true,
peeked: getPeeked(br),
protos: protos,
}, nil
}
func getPeeked(br *bufio.Reader) string {
@ -368,15 +391,15 @@ func getPeeked(br *bufio.Reader) string {
return string(peeked)
}
// sniSniffConn is a net.Conn that reads from r, fails on Writes,
// helloSniffConn is a net.Conn that reads from r, fails on Writes,
// and crashes otherwise.
type sniSniffConn struct {
type helloSniffConn struct {
r io.Reader
net.Conn // nil; crash on any unexpected use
}
// Read reads from the underlying reader.
func (c sniSniffConn) Read(p []byte) (int, error) { return c.r.Read(p) }
func (c helloSniffConn) Read(p []byte) (int, error) { return c.r.Read(p) }
// Write crashes all the time.
func (sniSniffConn) Write(p []byte) (int, error) { return 0, io.EOF }
func (helloSniffConn) Write(p []byte) (int, error) { return 0, io.EOF }