traefik/pkg/middlewares/forwardedheaders/forwarded_header.go

266 lines
7.2 KiB
Go
Raw Normal View History

package forwardedheaders
import (
"net"
"net/http"
"net/textproto"
"os"
"slices"
"strings"
"github.com/traefik/traefik/v2/pkg/ip"
"golang.org/x/net/http/httpguts"
)
const (
xForwardedProto = "X-Forwarded-Proto"
xForwardedFor = "X-Forwarded-For"
xForwardedHost = "X-Forwarded-Host"
xForwardedPort = "X-Forwarded-Port"
xForwardedServer = "X-Forwarded-Server"
xForwardedURI = "X-Forwarded-Uri"
xForwardedMethod = "X-Forwarded-Method"
xForwardedTLSClientCert = "X-Forwarded-Tls-Client-Cert"
xForwardedTLSClientCertInfo = "X-Forwarded-Tls-Client-Cert-Info"
xRealIP = "X-Real-Ip"
connection = "Connection"
upgrade = "Upgrade"
)
var xHeaders = []string{
xForwardedProto,
xForwardedFor,
xForwardedHost,
xForwardedPort,
xForwardedServer,
xForwardedURI,
xForwardedMethod,
xForwardedTLSClientCert,
xForwardedTLSClientCertInfo,
xRealIP,
}
2020-05-11 10:06:07 +00:00
// XForwarded is an HTTP handler wrapper that sets the X-Forwarded headers,
// and other relevant headers for a reverse-proxy.
// Unless insecure is set,
// it first removes all the existing values for those headers if the remote address is not one of the trusted ones.
type XForwarded struct {
insecure bool
trustedIPs []string
connectionHeaders []string
ipChecker *ip.Checker
next http.Handler
hostname string
}
// NewXForwarded creates a new XForwarded.
func NewXForwarded(insecure bool, trustedIPs []string, connectionHeaders []string, next http.Handler) (*XForwarded, error) {
var ipChecker *ip.Checker
if len(trustedIPs) > 0 {
var err error
ipChecker, err = ip.NewChecker(trustedIPs)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
}
hostname, err := os.Hostname()
if err != nil {
hostname = "localhost"
}
return &XForwarded{
insecure: insecure,
trustedIPs: trustedIPs,
connectionHeaders: connectionHeaders,
ipChecker: ipChecker,
next: next,
hostname: hostname,
}, nil
}
func (x *XForwarded) isTrustedIP(ip string) bool {
if x.ipChecker == nil {
return false
}
return x.ipChecker.IsAuthorized(ip) == nil
}
2020-05-11 10:06:07 +00:00
// removeIPv6Zone removes the zone if the given IP is an ipv6 address and it has {zone} information in it,
// like "[fe80::d806:a55d:eb1b:49cc%vEthernet (vmxnet3 Ethernet Adapter - Virtual Switch)]:64692".
func removeIPv6Zone(clientIP string) string {
if idx := strings.Index(clientIP, "%"); idx != -1 {
return clientIP[:idx]
}
return clientIP
}
2020-05-11 10:06:07 +00:00
// isWebsocketRequest returns whether the specified HTTP request is a websocket handshake request.
func isWebsocketRequest(req *http.Request) bool {
containsHeader := func(name, value string) bool {
h := unsafeHeader(req.Header).Get(name)
for {
pos := strings.Index(h, ",")
if pos == -1 {
return strings.EqualFold(value, strings.TrimSpace(h))
}
if strings.EqualFold(value, strings.TrimSpace(h[:pos])) {
return true
}
h = h[pos+1:]
}
}
return containsHeader(connection, "upgrade") && containsHeader(upgrade, "websocket")
}
func forwardedPort(req *http.Request) string {
if req == nil {
return ""
}
if _, port, err := net.SplitHostPort(req.Host); err == nil && port != "" {
return port
}
if unsafeHeader(req.Header).Get(xForwardedProto) == "https" || unsafeHeader(req.Header).Get(xForwardedProto) == "wss" {
return "443"
}
if req.TLS != nil {
return "443"
}
return "80"
}
func (x *XForwarded) rewrite(outreq *http.Request) {
if clientIP, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(outreq.RemoteAddr); err == nil {
clientIP = removeIPv6Zone(clientIP)
if unsafeHeader(outreq.Header).Get(xRealIP) == "" {
unsafeHeader(outreq.Header).Set(xRealIP, clientIP)
}
}
xfProto := unsafeHeader(outreq.Header).Get(xForwardedProto)
if xfProto == "" {
// TODO: is this expected to set the X-Forwarded-Proto header value to
// ws(s) as the underlying request used to upgrade the connection is
// made over HTTP(S)?
2020-06-10 12:32:03 +00:00
if isWebsocketRequest(outreq) {
if outreq.TLS != nil {
unsafeHeader(outreq.Header).Set(xForwardedProto, "wss")
2020-06-10 12:32:03 +00:00
} else {
unsafeHeader(outreq.Header).Set(xForwardedProto, "ws")
2020-06-10 12:32:03 +00:00
}
} else {
2020-06-10 12:32:03 +00:00
if outreq.TLS != nil {
unsafeHeader(outreq.Header).Set(xForwardedProto, "https")
2020-06-10 12:32:03 +00:00
} else {
unsafeHeader(outreq.Header).Set(xForwardedProto, "http")
2020-06-10 12:32:03 +00:00
}
}
}
if xfPort := unsafeHeader(outreq.Header).Get(xForwardedPort); xfPort == "" {
unsafeHeader(outreq.Header).Set(xForwardedPort, forwardedPort(outreq))
}
if xfHost := unsafeHeader(outreq.Header).Get(xForwardedHost); xfHost == "" && outreq.Host != "" {
unsafeHeader(outreq.Header).Set(xForwardedHost, outreq.Host)
}
// Per https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2616#section-4.2, the Forwarded IPs list is in
// the same order as the values in the X-Forwarded-For header(s).
if xffs := unsafeHeader(outreq.Header).Values(xForwardedFor); len(xffs) > 0 {
unsafeHeader(outreq.Header).Set(xForwardedFor, strings.Join(xffs, ", "))
}
if x.hostname != "" {
unsafeHeader(outreq.Header).Set(xForwardedServer, x.hostname)
}
}
2020-05-11 10:06:07 +00:00
// ServeHTTP implements http.Handler.
func (x *XForwarded) ServeHTTP(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if !x.insecure && !x.isTrustedIP(r.RemoteAddr) {
for _, h := range xHeaders {
unsafeHeader(r.Header).Del(h)
}
}
x.rewrite(r)
x.removeConnectionHeaders(r)
x.next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
}
func (x *XForwarded) removeConnectionHeaders(req *http.Request) {
var reqUpType string
if httpguts.HeaderValuesContainsToken(req.Header[connection], upgrade) {
reqUpType = unsafeHeader(req.Header).Get(upgrade)
}
var connectionHopByHopHeaders []string
for _, f := range req.Header[connection] {
for _, sf := range strings.Split(f, ",") {
if sf = textproto.TrimString(sf); sf != "" {
// Connection header cannot dictate to remove X- headers managed by Traefik,
// as per rfc7230 https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7230#section-6.1,
// A proxy or gateway MUST ... and then remove the Connection header field itself
// (or replace it with the intermediary's own connection options for the forwarded message).
if slices.Contains(xHeaders, sf) {
continue
}
// Keep headers allowed through the middleware chain.
if slices.Contains(x.connectionHeaders, sf) {
connectionHopByHopHeaders = append(connectionHopByHopHeaders, sf)
continue
}
// Apply Connection header option.
req.Header.Del(sf)
}
}
}
if reqUpType != "" {
connectionHopByHopHeaders = append(connectionHopByHopHeaders, upgrade)
unsafeHeader(req.Header).Set(upgrade, reqUpType)
}
if len(connectionHopByHopHeaders) > 0 {
unsafeHeader(req.Header).Set(connection, strings.Join(connectionHopByHopHeaders, ","))
return
}
unsafeHeader(req.Header).Del(connection)
}
// unsafeHeader allows to manage Header values.
// Must be used only when the header name is already a canonical key.
type unsafeHeader map[string][]string
func (h unsafeHeader) Set(key, value string) {
h[key] = []string{value}
}
func (h unsafeHeader) Get(key string) string {
if len(h[key]) == 0 {
return ""
}
return h[key][0]
}
func (h unsafeHeader) Values(key string) []string {
return h[key]
}
func (h unsafeHeader) Del(key string) {
delete(h, key)
}